

1. SYNOPSIS of *De Anima* II.4

- Part 1 (415a14-22): Methodological remarks: capacity of the soul → activity → object
- Part 2 (415a22-b7): On nourishment *and generation* as a function of the nutritive capacity
- Part 3 (415b8-416a18): On the soul as a triple cause: the case of growth and diminution
- Part 4 (416a19-b31): On the nutriment (*hē trophē*)
 - Section 1 (416a19-b11): How the nutriment is related to the nourished thing (*to trephomenon*)
 - Section 2 (416b11-20): The three effects of the nutriment
 - Section 3 (416b20-31): The factors involved in nourishment

2. ARISTOTLE’S QUESTIONS: *De Anima* II.2, 413b11-15

<p><i>νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις ὄρισται, θρεπτικῶ, αἰσθητικῶ, διανοητικῶ, κινήσει. πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μέρος, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ...</i></p>	<p>For now let just this much be said: the soul is the principle of things mentioned and is delimited by them, namely by the nutritive capacity, perceptual capacity, thinking capacity and locomotive capacity. Whether each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part of a soul, whether it is separable in account only or also in place...</p>
--	---

3. TWO TYPES OF SEPARABILITY*


- (i) separability in place (or in magnitude): A is separable in place from B, if A can be found in some place to exist without B.
- (ii) separability in account (or in definition): A is separable in account from B, if an adequate account of A makes no reference to B.

*K. Corcilius and P. Gregoric, “Separability vs Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 39 (2010), 81-119

4. THE TABLE OF SOULHOOD AND PARTHOOD OF THE SOUL

PSYCHIC CAPACITY	CAN IT BE A SOUL?	IF PART OF THE SOUL, IS IT SEPARABLE	
		IN ACCOUNT?	ALSO IN PLACE?
<i>nutritive</i>	YES (in plants)	YES	YES (in plants), NO (in animals and humans)
<i>perceptual</i>	NO	YES	NO
<i>locomotive</i>	NO	NO	NO
<i>thinking</i>	YES (in divine beings)	YES	YES (in divine beings), NO (in animals and humans)

5. THE THREEFOLD ANALYSIS: Part 4, Section 3 (416b20-31)




6. THE RESTRICTION TO LIVING BEINGS: *De Anima* II.4, 416b9-11

<p>ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν τρέφεται μὴ μετέχον ζωῆς, τὸ ἔμψυχον ἂν εἴη σῶμα τὸ τρεφόμενον, ἢ ἔμψυχον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τροφή πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.</p>	<p>Since nothing is nourished which does not live, the nourished thing would be the ensouled body, <i>qua</i> ensouled, so that the nutriment is relative to the ensouled, and this in a non-accidental way.</p>
---	--

7. THE TRIPLE DISTINCTION: *De Anima* II.4, 416b11-20

<p>ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τροφή καὶ αὐξητικῶ εἶναι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποσόν τι τὸ ἔμψυχον, αὐξητικόν, ἢ δὲ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία, τροφή σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ἔστιν ἕως ἂν τρέφεται, καὶ γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφόμενου, ἀλλ' οἶον τὸ τρεφόμενον· ἤδη γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, γεννᾷ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ σώζει. ὥσθ' ἢ μὲν τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμις ἔστιν οἷα σώζειν τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δὲ τροφή παρασκευάζει ἐνεργεῖν· διὸ στερηθὲν τροφῆς οὐ δύναται εἶναι.</p>	<p>To be nutriment and to be productive of growth are different; for, insofar as the ensouled being is a quantitative thing, we have something productive of growth, and insofar as <the ensouled being> is a particular and a substance, we have the nutriment; for <the ensouled being> maintains its substance and exists as long as it is nourished; and <we have> something productive of generation, not of that which is nourished but of something like it; for the substance of that which is nourished is already in existence, and nothing generates itself, but maintains itself.</p>
--	--

8. ASPECTS OF THE NUTRIMENT



9. THE DEFINITION OF THE NUTRITIVE CAPACITY: (416b17-19)

<p>ὥσθ' ἢ μὲν τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμις ἔστιν οἷα σώζειν τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δὲ τροφή παρασκευάζει ἐνεργεῖν.</p>	<p>Hence, this sort of principle that belongs to the soul is the capacity which preserves that which has it insofar as it is the sort of thing that it is, and nutriment enables it to operate.</p>
---	---

10. THE PRIMARY SOUL IS GENERATIVE OF ANOTHER LIKE ONESELF: (416b23-25)

<p>ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννῆσαι οἶον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἶον αὐτό.</p>	<p>Since it is right to call each thing after its end, and the end is to generate another like oneself, the primary soul might be called <i>generative of another like oneself</i>.</p>
--	---

11. NOURISHMENT AS A FUNCTION OF GENERATION: Plato, *Symposium*, 207d1-e1

<p>ἡ θνητὴ φύσις (...) αἰεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν ζώων ζῆν καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό – οἶον ἐκ παιδαρίου ὁ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως ἂν πρεσβύτης γένηται· οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμοῦς ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος αἰεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ αἷμα καὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα.</p>	<p>Mortal nature always leaves behind a new young one in place of the old. Even in the period that each individual animal is said to live and be itself—as a man is said to be the same from a child till he becomes an old man—this man is called the same even though he never has the same constituents in him, but is always becoming young while in other respects passing away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his whole body.</p>
--	--