


OUTLINE

1. Introduction
2. Reflexive awareness in Aristotle
3. Perceiving that we are *not* seeing and hearing
4. Beefing up the inner sense story
5. Problems and solutions

Text 1 (*De Anima* III.2, 425b12-25)

Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary that one perceives that one sees either by sight or by some other sense. But the same sense will be of sight and the underlying color, so that either there will be two senses of the same thing or it will be of itself. And furthermore, if indeed the sense that is of sight were different, then either it will go on to infinity or some sense will be of itself, so that we should do this in the case of the first sense. But there is a puzzle: for if perceiving by sight is seeing, and color or what has color is seen, then if something is going to see what sees, then the first thing that sees will also have color. However, it is clear that perceiving by sight is not one thing; for **even when we are not seeing, we discriminate both darkness and light by sight**, but not in the same way. Moreover, what sees is actually colored in a way: for the sense organ is in each case receptive of the sense object without the matter. That is why perceptions and appearances are present in the sense organs even when the sense objects have departed. [tr. Johansen, slightly changed]

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρώμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾶ, ἢ ἑτέρα. ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτῇ ἔσται τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος, ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῆς. ἔτι δ' εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἢ τῆς ὄψεως αἰσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἀπειρον εἴσω ἢ αὐτῇ τις ἔσται αὐτῆς· ὥστ' ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον. ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν ὁρᾶν, ὁράται δὲ χρῶμα ἢ τὸ ἔχον, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἔξει τὸ ὁρῶν πρώτον. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἔν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρώμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὑλης ἕκαστον· διὸ καὶ ἀπελλόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐνεῖσι αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις. [Ross ed. maior]

Text 2 (*De Somno* 2, 455a12-22)

Since in the case of each sense there is something special and something common, e.g. seeing is special to the sense of sight, and hearing to the sense of hearing, and so for each of the other senses, **there is also some common power which accompanies all the senses, by which one perceives also that one sees and hears (for surely it is not by sight that one sees that one sees**, and it is not by taste or by sight or by both that one discriminates, or would be able to discriminate, that sweet things are different from the white things), but by some part common to all the sense-organs. For there is one sense, and the controlling sense-organ is one, though the being is different for the sense of each kind, such as sound and colour...

ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπάρχει καθ' ἑκάστην αἰσθησιν τὸ μὲν τι ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ τι κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν οἶον τῇ ὄψει τὸ ὁρᾶν, τῇ δ' ἀκοῇ τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἑκάστη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἔστι δὲ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾶ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾶ ὅτι ὁρᾶ, καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται κρίνειν ὅτι ἑτέρα τὰ γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτε ἀμφοῖν), ἀλλὰ τινι κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἀπάντων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ μία αἰσθησις, καὶ τὸ κύριον αἰσθητήριον ἓν, τὸ δ' εἶναι αἰσθήσει τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου ἕτερον, οἶον ψόφου καὶ χρώματος...

Text 3 (*De Anima* II.9, 421b3-6)

It is also the case that smell is like hearing and each of the other senses: hearing is of the audible and inaudible; sight is of the visible and invisible, and smelling is of the scented and unscented. [tr. Shields]

ἔστι δ' ὡσπερ ἢ ἀκοῇ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἢ μὲν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ ἀνηκούστου, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ ἢ ὄσφρησις τοῦ ὄσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντου.

Text 4 (De Anima II.10, 422a20-21)

Sight is of the visible and the invisible (for darkness is invisible, and sight discriminates this too), and, moreover, of that which is overly bright (for this too is invisible, though in a different way from that in which darkness is); similarly, hearing is of noth sound and silence... [tr. Shields]

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὄρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀόρατου (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τε τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀκουστόν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀκουστόν...

Text 5 (De Somno 2, 455a28-b2)

For if sleeping occurs because of some affection of all the senses, it would be strange if capacities that need not, and in a certain way cannot be exercised simultaneously, should necessarily be inactive and immobilized simultaneously. For just the opposite would be a more logical outcome, i.e. that they should not be simultaneous at rest. But on our present theory, a reasonable account can be given of these issues too. For when the sense-organ which controls all the others, and upon which the others converge, has undergone a certain affection, then all the others must be affected together with it; whereas if any one of the latter is disabled, the former need not be disabled as well. [tr. D. Gallop, slightly changed]

εἰ γὰρ τῷ πάσας τι πεπονθέναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐγένετο τὸ καθεύδειν, ἄτοπον εἰ αἷς οὔτε ἀνάγκη οὔτε δυνατὸν τρόπον τινὰ ἐνεργεῖν ἅμα, ταύτας ἀναγκαῖον ἀργεῖν ἅμα καὶ ἀκινήτίζειν· τούναντίον γὰρ εὐλογώτερον συνέβαιεν ἂν αὐταῖς, τὸ μὴ ἅμα ἡρεμεῖν. ὡς δὲ νῦν λέγομεν, εὐλόγως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτων· τοῦ γὰρ κυρίου τῶν ἄλλων πάντων αἰσθητηρίου, καὶ πρὸς ὃ συντείνει τὰλλα, πεπονθότος τι συμπάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, ἐκείνων δὲ τινος ἀδυνατοῦτος οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἀδυνατεῖν.

Text 6 (De Insomniis 3, 461b30-462a8)

Just as for someone who is unaware of a finger being pressed beneath his eye, a single object would not only appear two, but would actually be judged to be two, whereas for someone aware of it, it will appear but will not be judged to be two; so during periods of sleep: if someone perceives that he is asleep, i.e. that it is a sleeping state in which the perception is occurring, then there is an appearance, but something in him says that it appears to be Coriscus, and yet Coriscus is not there. (For often something in the soul of a person asleep says that what is appearing is a dream). But if he is unaware that he is asleep, then nothing will contradict the appearance. [tr. D. Gallop, slightly changed]

ὥσπερ οὖν εἴ τινα λανθάνοι ὑποβαλλόμενος ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, οὐ μόνον φανέεται ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἓν, ἂν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανέεται μὲν οὐ δόξει δέ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐν ᾧ ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φαίνεται μὲν, λέγει δὲ τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κορίσκος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κορίσκος (πολλάκις γὰρ καθεύδοντος λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ φαινόμενον)· ἐὰν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντιφῆσει τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

Text 7 (De Insomniis 2, 460b20-22)

The reason why these things happen is that the controlling part and that by which appearances occur do not judge by the same power. Proof of this is that the sun appears one foot across, and yet frequently something else contradicts the appearance. Again, by crossing of the fingers a single object appears two, but even so we still deny that there are two things. For sight has more authority than touch. If touch were our only sense, we would take that one thing to be two. [tr. D. Gallop, slightly changed]

αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν κρίνειν τό τε κύριον καὶ ᾧ τὰ φαντάσματα γίνεται. τούτου δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, ἀντίφησι δὲ πολλάκις ἕτερόν τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν. καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ φαμεν δύο· κυριωτέρα γὰρ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡ ὄψις. εἰ δ' ἦν ἡ ἀφῆ μόνη, κἂν ἐκρίνομεν τὸ ἐν δύο.

Text 8 (De Sensu 2, 438b12-16)

What seemed to some soldiers who received in battle a blow on the temple that severed the passages of the eye, is that **darkness fell as if a lamp had gone out**; because what is called the pupil, i.e. the transparent, which is a sort of lamp, is then cut off.

ἦδη γὰρ τισι πληγεῖσιν ἐν πολέμῳ παρὰ τὸν κρόταφον οὕτως ὥστ' ἀποτμηθῆναι τοὺς πόρους τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἔδοξε γενέσθαι σκότος ὥσπερ λύχνου ἀποσβεσθέντος, διὰ τὸ οἶον λαμπτήρᾳ τινα ἀποτμηθῆναι τὸ διαφανές, τὴν καλουμένην κόρη.

Text 9 (De insomniis 3, 461a30-b7)

Thus something is made to appear, and because of effects carried inward from the sense of sight it seems to one to that one is seeing, or because of those from the sense of hearing, that one is hearing, and likewise for those from the other sense-organs. **For even when one is awake, it is because the movement from those sources reaches the origin that it seems to one that one is seeing and hearing and perceiving.** And it is because vision sometimes seems to be moved, when it is not, that we say we are seeing; and because touch reports two movements, that one object seems to be two. For in general the origin affirms the report from each sense, provided that some other, more authoritative one does not contradict it. In every case, then, something appears, yet what appears does not in every case seem to be real; it is, though, if the discerning part is held in check or fails to move with its own proper movement. [tr. D. Gallop, slightly changed]

τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγγρηγορῶς δοκεῖ ὄραν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἐνίοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν, οὐ κινουμένην, ὄραν φαμεν, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἀφήν δύο κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἐν δύο δοκεῖ. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως φησιν ἢ ἀρχή, εἰ μὴ ἕτερα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῆ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἂν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινήται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν.

Text 10 (De Sensu 7, 448a26-30)

For if it is impossible that a person should, while perceiving himself or something else in a continuous time, be at any instant unaware of his own existence, and if there is something in the continuum [of time] so small as to be absolutely imperceptible, it is clear that a person would be unaware of his own existence in that period, as well as of seeing and perceiving.

εἰ γάρ, ὅτε αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τις αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἄλλον ἐν συνεχεῖ χρόνῳ, μὴ ἐνδέχεται τότε λαμβάνειν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ τις ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσος ὅλως ἀναίσθητός ἐστι, δηλον ὅτι τότε λαμβάνοι ἂν εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸς αὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ὄρα καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

Text 11 (Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, 1170a29-b1)

MS reading:

...but one who sees perceives that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is something that perceives that we are active, so that we perceive that we perceive, and we think that we think, and [to perceive or think] that we are perceiving or thinking is [to perceive or think] that we exist (for to be just is to perceive or think).

...ὁ δ' ὄρων ὅτι ὄρα αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανόμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῦμεν ἂν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν).

Bywater's reading :

...but one who sees perceives that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is something that perceives that we are active, so that we would perceive that we perceive, and if we think [we would perceive] that we think, and [to perceive] that we are perceiving or thinking is [to perceive] that we exist (for to be just is to perceive or think).

...ὁ δ' ὄρων ὅτι ὄρα αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν).

Text 12 (Metaphysics Λ.9, 1074b35-36)

[The divine *nous*] will think itself, therefore, granted that he is the best, and his thinking is thinking of thinking. But **it seems that knowledge, perception, belief and thought are always of something else, and of themselves on the side.** Moreover, if to think and to be thought are different, does the good belong to it on account of it thinking or on account of it being thought? For neither is the essence of thinking and being thought the same.

αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἢ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. φαίνεται δ' αἰετὸν ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἢ αἰσθήσις καὶ ἢ δόξα καὶ ἢ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. ἐτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ.