

## OVERVIEW

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Text 1 (*De anima* III.1, 425b4-11)

We have several senses, so that the accompanying common sensibles will be less likely to escape our notice. For if there were only vision, and if it were of white, common sensibles would more likely escape our notice and it would seem that all were the same because colour and magnitude accompany one another at the same time. As things are, since the common sensibles are also present in another type of special sensible, this makes clear that each of them is something distinct.

Text 2 (*De anima* III.1, 425a27-28)

But for the common objects we have even now a common sense, not incidentally. (tr. Hamlyn 1968: 41)

*τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·*

Text 3 (*De anima* III.2, 425b20-22)

It is evident, then, that perceiving by vision is not one thing; for even when we are not seeing, we discriminate light and darkness by vision, though not in the same way (tr. Shields 2016: 52, modified)

*φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὸ τῆ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῆ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως.*

Text 4 (*De Sensu* 7, 449a14-18)

Numerically one and the same thing is white and sweet and many other things, for even if such properties are not separable from one another, each one of them is different in being. The same should then be supposed to be the case with the soul — that which is perceptive of everything is numerically one and the same thing, but its being is different, for some things generically, for others specifically.

*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκὺ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά· εἰ γὰρ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον ἐκάστω. ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει τῶν δὲ εἶδει.*

Text 5 (*De anima* III.2, 426b29-427a2)


It is impossible for the same thing to be changed simultaneously by opposite changes, insofar as it is indivisible and in an indivisible time. For if something is sweet, it changes the sense or thought in one way, whereas the bitter changes it in the opposite way, and white in yet another way.

*ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ ἐν ἀδιαίρετῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ γὰρ γλυκὺ, ὡδὲ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐτέρως.*

Text 6 (*De anima* III.2, 427a9-14)

Rather, the discriminating thing is like what some call a point, which is divisible insofar as it is one or two. Insofar as it is indivisible, then, the discriminating thing is one and <it discriminates> at one time, whereas insofar as it is divisible, it uses the same dot twice at one time. Insofar as it uses the boundary as two, it discriminates two separate <things>, <since what is used> is in a way separated; whereas insofar as <it uses the boundary as> one, <it discriminates> one <thing> and at one time.

ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἦν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμὴν, ἣ μία καὶ δύο, ταύτη καὶ διαιρετή. ἣ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, ἐν τῷ κρινόν ἔστι καὶ ἅμα, ἣ δὲ διαιρετὸν ὑπάρχει, δις τῷ αὐτῷ χρηταί σημείω ἅμα. ἣ μὲν οὖν δυσι χρηταί τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ κεχωρισμένα, ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένως· ἣ δὲ ἐνί, ἐν καὶ ἅμα.

Text 7 (*De anima* III.7, 431a20-b1)

Although it has already been said what it is by which [the soul] discriminates what the difference is between sweet and hot, the following needs to be said as well: it is one thing, and that as a limit. These things too, being analogously and numerically one, stand to one another as those other things stand to each other. For what is the difference whether we puzzle over how it discriminates [sensibles that are] not homogeneous or [how it discriminates] opposites, such as white and black? Let A (white) stand to B (black) as C stands to D. So that the converse will be true as well [viz. A is to C as B is to D]. Now if C and D are to belong to one thing, they will be just like A and B—one and the same thing, but not the same in being—and likewise with those others. The same account would hold if A were sweet and B white.

- 431a 20 —τίνι δ' ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὸν καὶ θερμόν,  
εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὠδε. ἔστι γὰρ ἔν  
τι, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ ὅρος. καὶ ταῦτα, ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ  
ἀριθμῷ ὃν ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα.  
25 τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει  
ἢ τὰ ἐναντία. οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ  
λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ [ὡς ἐκεῖνα  
πρὸς ἄλληλα]. ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ τὰ ΓΔ ἐνί εἶη  
ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἔξει ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ ΑΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν  
καὶ ἐν, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ὁμοίως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς  
1 λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τὸ γλυκὸν εἶη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευκόν.

27 ὥστε codd. edd.: οὕτως W: οὕτὰ Simp.<sup>p</sup> τὰ codd. Simp.<sup>p</sup> edd.: om. SUVX ΓΔ codd.

Simp.<sup>p</sup> edd.: ΓΑ Ross<sup>ab</sup> ἐν codd. edd.: ἐν T: ἐν Cy

28 καὶ τὰ codd. Simp.<sup>p</sup> edd.: καὶ τὸ STV : καὶ εἰ τὰ coni. Torstrik AB codd. Simp.<sup>p</sup> edd.: ΔB Ross<sup>ab</sup>