

Although he at times seems to speak dismissively of the concept of the soul as consisting of parts, Aristotle makes use of the concept in putting forward his own views. What, then, is his view of parts of the soul? Normally, scholarly interest focuses on the ontological issues connected with this question, most notably problems connected with the unity of the partitioned soul. This workshop tries to approach the question from a methodological perspective. This includes the following issues: Aristotle's methodological criticism of the Platonic ways of soul-partitioning / The correspondence of domains of science according to parts of soul / The role of parts of soul in the argument of the *De anima* / Parts of soul and the dynamis - energeia distinction / Parts and capacities of the soul / Parts of soul and homogeneity, separability, etc.

FRIDAY 13RD

9.30 – 10.00 *coffee*

10.00 – 11.20

ROBERT BOLTON

Aristotle's Method in the Study of Perception: *De Anima* II.5

11.30 – 13.00

RICHARD KING

meros – dynamis – energeia in the *De Anima*

12.45 – 15.00 *lunch*

15.00 – 16.20

KLAUS CORCILIOUS

The Soul Itself

16.30 – 17.45

PIETER SJÖRD HASPER

Parts of the Soul in an Aristotelian Science of the Soul

19.00 *dinner*

SATURDAY 14TH

10.00 – 11.20

JAKUB KRAJCZYNSKI

What did Aristotle Find out about Soul by cutting Plants and Insects?

11.30 – 12.45

FRANCESCA PEDRIALI

Homogeneity and Partition of the Soul. Two Related Problems of *De Anima* I.1

12.45 – 15.00 *lunch*

15.00 – 16.20

JAMES G. LENNOX

Aristotle on Mind, Soul and the Science of Nature

16.30 – 17.45

PAVEL GREGORIC

Separability vs. Difference: The Criterion of Parthood of the Soul in Aristotle

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