

**ROBERT BOLTON: Aristotle's Method in the Study of Perception: *De Anima* II.5**

In this discussion I investigate various proposals concerning Aristotle's method of inquiry in his study of the parts of the soul, with particular attention to his introductory discussion of the perceptual part in *De Anima* II.5.

**FRANCESCA PEDRIALI: Homogeneity and Partition of the Soul. Two related Problems of *De Anima* I.1**

In my paper I will discuss Aristotle's treatment of parts of the soul as an alternative solution to the problem of non-homogeneity (*ouk homoeideia*) of the soul. My reading is suggested by Aristotle himself in the opening questions of *De Anima* I. 1. Indeed, the question of whether the soul is homogeneous or not is raised in the first question concerning the parts of the soul, namely «whether the soul does have parts or not, and whether every soul is homogeneous or not» (cf. 402b1-2). Moreover, the assumption that the soul is not-homogeneous and therefore different either in kind or in genus is taken into account before Aristotle comes back to the problem of parts of the soul at 402b9.

In the rest of the *De Anima*, however, Aristotle does not devote so much attention to the problem of homogeneity or non-homogeneity of the soul. At least he does not deal with this problem with the same care as he does with the problem of parts of soul. In the whole *De Anima* we find several times the question concerning whether we perform some vital activities with the whole soul or with different parts of it, and also a number of questions inquiring about the kind of separability of such parts from each other and from the whole soul. In contrast, the problem of the homogeneous or non-homogeneous character of the soul appears only scarcely in the first Book of *De Anima*, and mostly in Aristotle's critical remarks on his predecessors. For this reason, this problem seems to be not at all a significant part of Aristotle's positive treatment of the soul.

The aim of my paper is to show in which way the problem of parts of soul and that of its non-homogeneity are related, and to explain why Aristotle does not return to the problem of *homoeideia* in the rest of *De Anima*. I analyze in detail the passage 402b1-10 and offer an interpretation of 402b1-2. I also compare the use of *homoidēs/es* in this passage with the other occurrences of the word in *De Anima*.

**PIETER SJOERD HASPER: Parts of the Soul in an Aristotelian Science of the Soul**

Aristotle can be very casual in his talk about parts or capacities of the soul. Most of the time, however, Aristotle gives the distinct impression that there are capacities which are merely that, capacities, and others which are parts of the soul in a stronger sense. Several criteria have been proposed: parts of the soul are individuated by reference to bodily parts or systems; by reference to the differences in the extensional distribution of capacities among different kinds of organisms; by reference to what Aristotle calls 'separability in being or account', understood as definitional independence. Though there may be something to each of these proposals, I shall show that none of them really works. I shall propose an alternative: parts are those capacities or sets of capacities which are set over the same kind of intentional objects: the nutritive part over one, the perceptive part over another, and the rational part over yet another kind. We can see this criterion at work in several arguments concerning parts and their individuation. Finally I shall briefly discuss some of the consequences of this way of dividing the soul for the science of the soul.

**RICHARD KING: Powers and Parts in *De Anima***

The concept of *dynamis* plays two crucial roles in *De Anima*. Firstly, the talk of powers of the soul; and secondly in the triple scheme (so called first potentiality, second potentiality, first actuality and second actuality). In this paper I wish to try to show how the concrete powers of the soul used by Aristotle fit into the triple scheme, and how this structures the enquiry into the soul. Ontology determines method.

**JAKUB KRAJCZYNSKI: What did Aristotle Find out About Soul by Cutting Plants and Insects?**

Aristotle makes several allusions to the phenomenon of plants and animals continuing to live while divided. I first want to distinguish exactly what phenomena he has in mind and to reconstruct his explanations for these. Second I'll discuss briefly the different argumentative usages he makes of these phenomena in the different contexts. Third I would like to sketch how the cutting of worms and plants is relevant for questions about the relation of hylomorphism, understood as the claim that soul is the first actuality of a whole natural organic body, and cardiocentrism, taken as a claim that the principle of the soul is primarily localized in only one part of this organic body. I would like to argue in particular that, on Aristotle's view, the worm example shows that although the soul is dependent for its (second) actualization on the whole organic body (actualization dependence), the same soul is dependent for its existence only on one part of the organic body (existence dependence) namely the heart.

**JAMES G. LENNOX: Aristotle on Mind, Soul and the Science of Nature**

Aristotle appears to endorse premises implying that an animal's soul constitutes an important part of its nature and thus is to be studied by the natural scientist. The premises are:

1. Natural things have formal and material natures.
2. For living things, their formal nature is soul.

Which implies:

3. To investigate the formal nature of a living thing, the natural scientist must study soul.

Many have thus concluded that Aristotle is a naturalist regarding the study of the soul. Life with Aristotle is, however, rarely so simple. In *Parts of Animals* I. 1, Aristotle argues that the natural scientist should *not* investigate all soul, since not all soul is a nature. Specifically, he argues that the natural scientist should not investigate thought ( $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ) or reasoning ( $\delta\iota\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha$ ) (641b8-9). This claim raises important questions about the unity of a theoretical investigation of the soul and about the scientific investigation of the mind. These questions will be explored by focusing attention on Aristotle's reflections.

**KLAUS CORCILIOUS: The Soul Itself**

The *De Anima* I. 1 is devoted to the finding of the definition of the soul. With this, Aristotle wants to find out something about the properties of the soul *itself* as opposed to the properties that living beings possess in virtue of having a soul. In this paper, I will attempt to track the nature of this distinction and some of its implications. I will argue that it plays a significant role both in the structure of the *De Anima* and in Aristotle's understanding of parts of the soul: Parts of the soul are parts of the soul itself and not properties that living beings possess in virtue of having a soul.

**PAVEL GREGORIC: Separability vs. Difference: The Criterion of Parthood of the Soul in Aristotle**

One of the methodological problems raised in *De Anima* I.1 is whether the soul has parts or not, and if it does have parts, how should one 'determine which parts are by their nature different from one another' (402b10-11). Aristotle expresses reservations about the talk of parts of the soul, yet he himself seems to find such talk useful. His talk of parts is usually understood as tentative, parts of the soul being nothing other than capacities of the soul. However, there are passages in the *De Anima* which speak against identifying parts and capacities of the soul. In this paper it will be argued that Aristotle distinguishes between parts and capacities of the soul. More specifically, it will be argued that he has a criterion for determining which capacities count as parts of the soul such that they are 'by their nature different from one another', and that this criterion is operative in much of the *De Anima*. Some objections against this view will be raised and discussed.